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TECHNOLOGY 
BRIEFING SERIES
Demos is producing a series of briefings about technology, bringing together 
experts from policy, practice and tech.
We recognise that technology can present a challenge to policy makers. The 
aim of this series is to help with that challenge: to explain the technology 
clearly and succinctly, to report expert opinion with clarity, and to share the 
views of big players in the world of technology.
This report is the first in the series. It examines child sexual abuse images 
(CSAI) and their distribution and consumption online.
We are especially grateful for interviews, input and expert advice from the 
Internet Watch Foundation, CEOP, law enforcement, academics, internet 
companies and third-sector organisations. A list of interviewees is contained 
in the appendix.
The report is based on a careful review of existing literature and interviews 
with various experts, including the Internet Watch Foundation, CEOP, law 
enforcement, academics, internet companies and third-sector organisations 
that work with offenders and victims.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
New technology has made the task of 
tackling CSAI significantly more difficult. 
Specifically, the internet has allowed for 
new channels of access and distribution 
that are often based overseas and change 
frequently with technological advance. 
While the problem is borderless, law 
enforcement remains geographically 
constrained.
There are no easy solutions to this 
problem. It is not possible to develop a 
singular, technological solution to this 
problem: success to date has turned on 
effective industry self-regulation and 
commitment of industry resources. This 
can be illustrated by the small proportion
of illegal content identified on social 
media platforms and other major 
technology companies, and the reputation 
of regulators like the IWF.
However, there is a significant amount of 
investment in using technology to identify 
material, which is proving valuable in 
tackling the problem. This needs further 
support. 
Police successes in identifying and 
prosecuting criminals who operate in this 
area have tended to rely on both 
international co-operation and forensic 
detective work. Investment in this type of 
policing is necessary. When resources are 
stretched, it is necessary for policing to 
focus resources on the most serious 
offenses: those which can be most 
effective in reducing harm to children.
Prevention work, while difficult, remains 
one area where more can be done. There 
is a general consensus that investing 
more in schemes to work with potential 
offenders and prevent re-offending would 
be a positive move.
It will not be possible to ensure informed 
public debate about CSAI without 
responsible reporting of the problem. It is 
everybody’s responsibility to report on the 
subject carefully, in an informed way, and 
without conflating CSAI with other harmful 
online content. Lessons could be learned 
from well-established reporting guidelines, 
such as news related to suicide. 
01.
Introduction to
CSAI Online
INTRODUCTION
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In 1990 the Home
Office estimated the
figure of video- or
paper-based CSAI in
circulation to
around 7,000
images; today, police
seizures often
involve millions of
digitally stored
images.
The Internet has fundamentally
changed the way in which child
sexual abuse images (CSAI) are
produced, distributed, consumed
and combated. New sources and
new channels for the online
exploitation of children have been
opened up. Millions of images in
circulation are easily accessible
online by thousands of adults, and
are located in places frequently
beyond the reach of national law
enforcement.
Combating child sexual abuse
online will require enforcement and
policy makers to keep up with the
pace of technological change. There
is, however, no technological silver
bullet: child sexual exploitation is an
old problem, and decision-makers
and the media must do more to
acknowledge this.
This briefing brings together
expertise from the fields of law
enforcement, technology, third-
sector support and academia to
clearly articulate the current state of
play, and offers evidence-based
recommendations for policy.
Possessing, making or sharing indecent images of children is a criminal
offence in the UK under the Protection of Children Act 1978 and the
Criminal Justice Act 1988. Indecent images of children can include child
sexual abuse images (CSAI) and self-generated indecent images. Since
2014, the UK Sentencing Council categorises CSAI into three levels:
Legally, a child is defined as a person under 18 years of age. In practice, the
fight against CSAI tends to focus on images that are clearly illegal and illegal
in many countries, typically including children 15 years and younger.
Category A
Images involving penetrative sexual activity; images 
involving sexual activity with an animal or sadism.
Category B Images involving non-penetrative sexual activity.
Category C Other indecent images not falling within categories A or B.
LEGAL DEFINITIONS
02.
Common Misconceptions about
Child Sexual Abuse Images Online
“Technology is a Silver Bullet.”01.
There have been important technological responses to CSAI, but technology can’t do 
everything. There is also a gap between who is able to implement technological 
solutions and who is responsible for the websites which are abused by CSAI offenders.
See more on page 19.
“Social media is primarily to blame.”02.
Reports suggest only a small proportion of CSAI is hosted on social media platforms, 
in part because many platforms already take steps to tackle it. However, social media 
can unwittingly offer new material to consumers posted by young people themselves, 
and provides new avenues for online grooming.
See more on page 21.
“Finding CSAI online is difficult.”03.
CSAI is not all hidden. It can be accessed easily, and even stumbled upon. 
See more on page 7.
“We can arrest our way out of the problem.”04.
Law enforcement, third-sector charities and academics agree that the numbers of 
adults engaging with CSAI online means arresting and prosecuting all offenders would 
not be possible. This underscores the need for a more wide-ranging response.
See more on page 24.
“A ban on encryption would be effective.”05.
The difficulties caused to law enforcement by the blanket uptake of encryption should 
not be underestimated, but frequently are. However, a ban is not a feasible solution, 
as it would not deal with the problem targeted, and likely create new ones.
See more on page 13.
Experts spoke to the advantages of self-regulation. In the UK, the IWF and its industry 
partners have tended to be quick to remove content and quicker to react and adapt to 
technological change. 
See more on page 18.
“Industry doesn’t self-regulate.”06.
Scale of Online Child
Sexual Abuse Imagery
03.
SCALE OF ONLINE CSAI
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(CEOP 2013)
(Home Office 2010)
(ONS 2016)
Estimating the scale of online Child
Sexual Abuse Imagery (CSAI) is
difficult. Investigations only identify
a fraction of offenders, victims can
take a long time to come forward,
and strong societal attitudes deter
self-reporting.
Accurate statistics for engagement
with CSAI online are a vital
requirement. Without knowing the
scale of the problem, policy and law
enforcement responses will remain
poorly informed and “the ability to
differentiate high risk cases and
suspects is reduced.”
However, changes to the way
images are produced and
distributed has made this extremely
difficult. There were 7000 indecent
images of children in circulation in
1990 in the UK. According to
sources in the police, that figure has
now risen to tens of millions. The
precise number of individuals
convicted of CSAI offences is not
published in the UK, but is included
in the number of people arrested
for ‘obscene publications’ violations.
This increased by 134 per cent to
7,324 in 2014/15. In total, 54,000
child sexual abuse offences (contact
abuse and CSAI) were recorded in
the UK 2015/16.
The actual number of offenders is
likely to be even higher. The Child
Exploitation and Online Protection
Centre (CEOP) estimated in 2013
that 50,000 individuals viewed CSAI
each year in the UK. A more recent
survey in Germany found that 2.4
per cent of men reported viewing
CSAI. Applying these figures to the
UK, the NSPCC estimates there may
be as many as 590,000 men in the
UK who have at some point viewed
CSAI, far higher than previous
estimates.
Offenders who access CSAI fall into
two broad categories. ‘Consumers’
view and distribute material, while
‘producers’ create material as well
as viewing and distributing it.
Offenders can also be classed by
technological sophistication.
Sophisticated offenders take steps
to protect their activity online, for
example, using encryption (see
below). Unsophisticated offenders
do not, and are therefore
significantly more vulnerable to law
enforcement investigation.
Estimates of the scale of CSAI in the
UK come primarily from the Internet
Watch Foundation (IWF), which
publishes annual statistics on the
CSAI identified on UK servers. It is
difficult to assess how well these
estimates reflect the true scale and
nature of CSAI offences in the UK –
images are widely duplicated and,
as with any crime, the criminals we
catch aren’t necessarily reflective of
the criminals at large.
Although it is well established that
CSAI is distributed across the
internet, exactly how is less well
understood. According to the IWF,
less than 0.01 per cent of identified
content is hosted in the United
Kingdom, down from 18 per cent in
1996. Most of the material the
Foundation identifies is hosted in
Europe (60 per cent) and North
America (37 per cent). According to
IWF reports, the Netherlands, the
USA and Canada are the most
frequent national hosts of CSAI.
.
(CEOP 2013)
(Dombert et al. 2016)
(Jütte 2016)
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Sophisticated Producers
Sophisticated Consumers
Unsophisticated Consumers
(i.e. no technological protection)
Unsophisticated Producers
(i.e. young people)
(Martellozzo et al.
2017)
The IWF’s figures suggest that the
majority of CSAI is found on image
hosting sites (72 per cent) and
cyberlockers (11 per cent). Only 0.01
per cent of the CSAI identified by the
IWF is hosted on social networking
sites. However, according to the
Chief Online Safety Officer at
Microsoft, Jacqueline Beauchere,
many CSAI are detected and
removed by social networking sites
themselves, before images can be
reported to the IWF. This suggests
that tech companies could be more
transparent about how much
material they are encountering and
the efforts they are taking to identify,
report, and remove CSAI.
Similarly, the IWF reports that only 1
per cent of the CSAI it identifies is
hosted on ‘Tor Hidden Services’,
often referred to as the ‘dark net’.
Because of the difficulty involved in
identifying illegal material on the
dark net, this figure is unlikely to
reflect the true scale of CSAI on
hidden services. This is further
compounded by content rarely
being ‘publicly available’, but limited
to site or forum members: the IWF is
not legally able to access this
content.
Earlier this year, some 20 per cent of
the dark net (under Freedom
Hosting II) was taken over by
hackers, which claimed that half of
the sites – or 10 per cent of the dark
net – were dedicated to CSAI.
Research by the Global Commission
on Internet Governance found that
CSAI was the most popular type of
content on the dark net.
Adding to the growing volume of
CSAI is a newer phenomenon. A
growing proportion of indecent
images of children are ‘self-
generated’ images, produced by
minors: one fifth of reported images
in 2015 were self-generated. This is
supported by the fact that around
16 per cent of young people aged
11-16 have reported sending sexual
images in the UK and 1 in 6 people
reported to the police for indecent
images are minors.
The chart below shows indicative
volumes of CSAI producers and
consumers online.
(NSPCC 2016)
An image hosting site 
stores images 
uploaded by its users. 
A cyberlocker is a 
website allowing users 
to store and download 
files. Both are often 
low-budget, hosted 
outside the UK and 
run by a handful of 
people.
(McCoogan 2017; 
Lewis 2016)
(Owen & Savage 
2015)
(NSPCC 2016)
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The data shown above is based on the websites reported to the IWF in 2016. 
Unreported, hidden sites are not included, nor are examples of CSAI that have been 
removed before a report was filed.
Where is Child Sexual 
Abuse Imagery Hosted?
60%
30%
0.1%
9.9%
Europe North America UK Other
72%
11%
0.01%
16.99%
Image Hosting Sites Cyber Lockers Social Networking
Sites
Other
Reported websites (IWF, 2016)
Technology Challenges
in CSAI
04.
“The Internet has significantly changed
offender behaviour. The key challenges
now are the huge volume of material and
the borderless nature of the Internet,
compared to the bordered nature of law
enforcement.”
Fred Langford
Deputy CEO at the Internet Watch 
Foundation
‘Law enforcement offline relies on CCTV
and DNA. We still need to find this audit
trail in the online space, but it is much
harder.’
David Gray
National Online Coordinator for CSE
Replicability & Interconnectedness 
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(Interpol 2017)
TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES
The Internet’s capacity to facilitate
the storage and transfer of billions
of files, to host communities of like-
minded Internet users, and to allow
both on an international scale, has
had predictable consequences for
CSAI. Files are replicated in multiple
locations, both online and offline.
Tackling the sources and hosts of
the files is difficult: with servers that
host Internet content located
around the world, close-
cooperation by technologically-
savvy law enforcement is a
necessity. One recent investigation
resulted in arrests across fifteen
countries in Central and South
America, and Europe. Known as
Operation Tantalio, it was
coordinated by Interpol and
Europol to target offenders sharing
CSAI over the messaging app
Whatsapp.
This section explains the key
technological developments which
have affected the ways in which
CSAI is stored and communicated,
changes in offender culture, and the
technological solutions
implemented or proposed by
parties dealing with CSAI online.
Encrypted Web Browsing and the ‘Dark Net’
Encryption – essentially a means of
keeping messages or Internet
activity hidden except to those who
are intended to see them – has
become an important part of how
the Internet works. According to
former director of GCHQ Robert
Hannigan, ‘encryption is
overwhelmingly a good thing’,
keeping us all ‘safe and secure’.
However, the recent uptake of
powerful encryption has been
picked up and used by various
individuals involved in the
distribution and storage of CSAI (as
well as extremism and the drugs
trade). This is especially true of
offenders with a relatively high level
of technical sophistication. Three
forms of encryption are worth
exploring in the context of CSAI.
Some perpetrators rely on ‘Tor
Hidden Services’ (websites where
server location is obscured using
proxies, also known as the ‘dark
net’). These websites are accessible
through special browsers, such as
‘Tor’, which encrypt the connection
and make tracing a user who is
browsing these ‘hidden services’
difficult. Similarly, those sharing
CSAI across peer-to-peer platforms
which allow the transfer of files
from one computer to another are
frequently protected by encryption.
Tor Hidden Services have a
reputation for hosting illegal
material. As discussed, the volume
of CSAI content in these systems is
difficult to measure accurately.
However, they play an important
role in the general availability of
material. Being difficult to censor
entirely, they can provide a
‘warehouse’ function, meaning there
is always a source of available
material.
Encryption
(BBC 2017) 
(Bartlett 2014)
A web server is a 
computer system 
which stores, 
processes, and 
delivers webpages 
to clients.
A proxy network is a 
computer or 
program which acts 
as an intermediary 
for local requests to 
other servers.
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‘End-to-end’ Encrypted Messaging
End-to-end encryption is where the
contents of a message sent
between two people cannot be read
by a third party. It is increasingly
included as standard in most
messaging apps and platforms by
companies increasingly conscious
of their customers’ privacy.
Experts confirm that end-to-end
encryption has made the tasks of
law enforcement more difficult:
prosecution requires an audit trail
of evidence which is frequently
inaccessible to either law
enforcement or even a cooperative
technology company.
Hardware Encryption
Encryption is also used by offenders
to store material. For example
VeraCrypt can create a virtual
encrypted disk for ‘on-the-fly
encryption’. TAILS, an encrypted
operating system, can be run from a
USB. However, the UK’s Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA)
2000 requires suspects to give up
passwords to encrypted systems or
face up to 5 years prison (for
suspected cases of ‘child
indecency’).
(CEOP 2013)
(Lilley et al. 2014)
Encryption has become a difficult policy area in recent months. While used 
by those accessing CSAI, it is also very widely used by journalists, whistle-
blowers, and ordinary members of the public. Encryption is the 
cornerstone of a digital economy and a digital culture. Internet banking, 
protection from hacking, and secure processing of data all depend on 
secure encryption systems.
Despite the challenges, limiting the use of encryption is not widely 
supported by experts in this area. Making the Internet less safe for 
everyone will not necessarily make it less safe for those sharing CSAI, and 
will expose British citizens to cybercrime at a time when they are 
increasingly at risk. The mathematics underpinning encryption are well 
known, and it is highly likely that security-conscious offenders would 
continue to use it under any kind of blanket ban.
Social Media Platforms
The last decade has seen a huge
growth in social media platforms
online, with 96 per cent of 16-24
year olds now using at least one.
Although not often used to
distribute CSAI, they provide a
platform through which young
people publish images that are
either publically available or
vulnerable to being shared without
permission. Social media also
provides a route between a
potential contact offender and
a victim, usually referred to as
grooming. A 2014 survey found that
12 per cent of children with a social
media profile had received
unwanted sexual messages online.
In 2012, CEOP identified social
networking sites as the most
common offending environment for
child exploitation: over 80 per cent
of online child exploitation cases in
the UK involved social networking or
instant messaging sites.
(compared to the UK 
average of 69 per 
cent; ONS 2017)
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(Martellozzo et al. 
2016)
‘Revenge porn’ is 
sexually explicit 
material shared 
without a person’s 
consent. Sextortion 
is blackmail using 
explicit material.
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Digital Culture Change
The Internet has had major impacts
on sexual culture, resulting in
changes in the nature and sources
of illegal pornography. Several
studies suggest that the high
volumes of Internet pornography in
circulation have normalized it,
changing attitudes to this type of
content among young people. A
recent study found that 53 per cent
of 16 year olds had seen
pornography, and 94 per cent of
them had seen it by the age of 14
Alongside the circulation of existing
CSAI, the use of smartphones by
young people to take indecent
images of themselves, or sharing
indecent images of other young
people they know, has created a
new challenge. Images posted to
social media by young people are
also at risk of being
misappropriated by paedophiles,
and both have inspired new
criminal activity, such as revenge
porn, sextortion and peer-on-peer
abuse.
Technological change has brought
with it cultural change among
offenders. Online anonymity can
create a feeling of safety, and lead
to a sense of disinhibition. As noted,
ease of access to all pornography
has been greatly increased by the
web. Voices within the child
protection community have
suggested that this availability has
also desensitized viewers of
pornography who may turn to
extreme or illegal pornography as
interest in legal content dwindles.
(Jütte 2016; 
Cline 2001)
(Suler 2004)
Emerging Trends
 Live streaming of abuse or
webcams, which is especially
difficult to detect in real-time and
leaving little or no digital trace.
 Online ‘cloud’ storage, which
reduces the need for offenders
to store images offline.
Increasing broadband speeds
also support the use of online-
only services.
 Default encryption, which is now
bundled by default with all
phones, messaging applications
and online services.
 Use of distributed networks,
which are difficult to censor.
 Unsecured ‘Internet of Things’
devices (such as a ‘smart’ TV)
acting as ‘safe’ repositories of
images, without the knowledge of
the device owner.
 Improvements in mobile
technology, such as the move
from 3G to 4G (and the
forthcoming 5G), will further
encourage streaming and ‘peer-
to-peer’ sharing, and reduce
reliance on offline storage.
A distributed 
network is not 
reliant on a central 
server: it could be 
operated across 
connected 
computers. This 
could be enabled by 
a new technology 
called ‘blockchain’, 
which acts as a 
distributed ledger 
for files or 
information.
Technological change continues apace, creating new opportunities for both
offenders and those tasked with stopping them. A comprehensive list is
impossible, but the following areas are likely to grow in importance in the
coming 3-5 years
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Encryption is now
bundled with all phones, 
messaging applications 
and online services.
Increasing availability
of CSAI as internet 
connectivity becomes 
universal.
Proliferation of
pornography online has 
changed attitudes to 
sexual imagery.
Live streaming of abuse
or webcams: especially 
difficult to detect in real-
time and leaving little or no 
digital trace.
‘Sextortion’ threat of 
publicising existing images 
unless additional images 
are produced.
Access to smart 
phones has allowed
young people to produce 
sexual images themselves, 
and images shared by 
parents are being misused.
Websites are hosted
around the world, 
requiring international 
cooperation to combat 
them.
Online ‘cloud’ storage
reduces the need for 
offenders to hoard offline. 
Increased broadband 
speeds support the use of 
online-only services.
A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
Responses
to CSAI
05.
“There is a misconception that tech can do
anything - when actually, there are things
that might be technically impossible.”
Expert Interviewee
Law & Policy
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The CAID is 
discussed in detail 
below. It is a 
database containing 
known CSAI images, 
each of which has 
been given a unique 
‘hash’ or ID.
RESPONSES TO CSAI
The two central pieces of legislation
on CSAI in the UK are Section 1 of
the Protection of Children Act 1978
and Section 160 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988. Both of these acts
stipulate offences for indecent
photographs (or pseudo-
photographs) of a child.
The 1978 Act establishes offences
for taking, making, distributing, and
possessing CSAI. This has been
more commonly used in
prosecutions than the 1988 Act,
which concerns the possession of
images only. Case law has
established that ‘making’ images
under the 1978 Act can include
opening email attachments,
downloading images to a computer,
storing images on a computer, and
accessing a website with ‘pop-ups’ -
whenever this is done deliberately
with the knowledge that there are
(likely to be) indecent images of
children (CPS). The Protection of
Children Act 1978 has therefore
afforded courts the ability to adapt
understandings of this offence to
reflect new technologies.
Downloading images hosted
outside the UK remains an act of
‘making’ within the UK’s jurisdiction.
The Sexual Offences Act 2003
changed the definition of a ‘child’ to
include young people aged 18 years
and lower, and also prohibits other
child exploitation offences, including
grooming.
Before the last election, additional
measures were taken by the
government to tackle CSAI. The
Independent Inquiry into Child
Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was
announced in 2014 by then Home
Secretary Theresa May. Alongside
the inquiry, the government has
supported the creation of the
WePROTECT Global Alliance, the
Child Abuse Image Database (CAID),
and international cooperation by
intelligence agencies. However,
complications with the IICSA and
the impact of Brexit and counter-
terrorism on political priorities have
moved the spotlight away from
CSAI.
Self Regulation
The IWF has an advantaged role in
policing of CSAI in the UK. It is an
independent, self-regulatory
organisation. Experts within the IWF
and external to it have argued that
this approach has allowed the IWF
to keep up with the pace of
technological development over the
past two decades, operating with
greater agility than a legislative
approach might allow. The IWF
currently publishes biennial audits,
and points to the speed at which
content is now removed and the
large reduction in UK hosted
content as evidence of their
effectiveness.
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(CEOP 2013)
A Memorandum of Understanding
between the NPCC and the CPS
formally recognises the work of the
IWF and protects its employees
from prosecution in the course of
their legitimate search for illegal
content. The IWF provides a hotline
for reporting CSAI and since April
2014 itself has proactively searched
for publicly-available images,
including those hosted on the ‘dark
net’, which are reported to host
country hotlines or law
enforcement.
Since 2015, the IWF has also
contributed to the CAID by
assessing and categorising images
for law enforcement, and will in the
future contribute to the CAID
directly.
The policing response to CSAI has
been divided between local police
forces, which tend to focus on
pursuing less technologically
sophisticated offenders, and CEOP,
NCA and GCHQ, which investigate
more complex cases, such as
international rings, live streaming,
organised crime, and CSAI on the
dark net. According to experts, law
enforcement has benefited from
significant investment in technical
skills in recent years, but in order to
ensure a national response,
continued investment will be
required to guarantee competence
across police forces.
There is a clear correlation between
CSAI offences and contact offences
against children, but a causal
relationship has not been
established – we do not know
whether CSAI satisfies or
exacerbates the demand for
contact abuse. CEOP has therefore
recommended that CSAI offenders
be viewed as potential contact
offenders ‘to some extent.
Policing
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Image hashes are 
unique ‘digital 
fingerprints’ 
assigned to known 
CSAI. There are 
different ways of 
assigning image 
hashes, such as 
PhotoDNA and SHA-
2, meaning each 
image can have 
multiple different 
hashes, but two 
different images 
cannot share the 
same hash. New 
images can be 
checked against the 
hashes of known 
images by a 
computer, saving 
time and human 
resources.
Child Abuse Image Databases (CAID)
In 2014, the Home Office developed
a unified Child Abuse Image
Database (CAID) to bring together
all CSAI collected by all UK police
and the National Crime Agency
(NCA). Newly found images can be
uploaded to CAID, which
automatically compares them to the
images hashed in the database and
sorts them by level of severity.
Thanks to this, law enforcement can
more quickly identify any ‘first
generation images’ (newly produced
CSAI) and begin the victim
identification process.
Internationally, Interpol
supplements traditional
investigative methods and image
analysis with the International Child
Sexual Exploitation (ICSE) image and
video database. However,
differences in countries’ CSAI
legislation means that Interpol must
adopt a lowest common
denominator approach. This is the
intention of the ‘Worst of’-list, which
is a list of hashes that identify
material that would be illegal in any
country.
Efforts have been made to make
this technology available to smaller
hosts, for whom funding is limited.
However, rollout has not taken
place in the parts of the web where
CSAI is most prevalent because
hosts lack the capacity or interest in
building preventative measures.
One independent expert told us
that there is a major problem with
the ‘long-tail’ of providers: small
companies that can’t deal with the
responsibilities of hosting, and may
be inadvertently hosting illegal
material but do not have the
capacity or know how to monitor
and remove it.
TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSES
Currently, tackling online CSAI in the
UK is a collaborative effort involving
policy-makers, law enforcement,
technology companies, and civil
society organisations. This is in large
part due to the technical complexity
involved in dealing with aspects of
online material, which exceeds the
capacity of law enforcement alone.
Website Blocking
The IWF provides a list of URLs
known to contain CSAI. Updated
twice a day, it can be used by
network operators, social media
companies and filtering providers to
block access to these websites and
search engines to stop indexing
them. The IWF also offers domain
and payment brand alerts to
companies wishing to quickly
identify and remove illegal websites
that are registered or receiving
money through them.
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Website blocking is seen as a
preventative measure - the details
of people who have been redirected
away from known illegal domains
are not typically retained or shared
with law enforcement and accessing
domains once (or even a few times)
are unlikely to form the basis of a
prosecution.
Earlier this year, the Canadian
Centre for Child Protection
launched a new tool called Project
Arachnid, which is an automated
‘webcrawler’ that follows links from
known CSAI websites across the
clear and dark net. In an initial six-
week trial of the crawler, it
successfully scanned 230 million
individual webpages, 5.1 million of
which were found to have child
sexual abuse material. This is the
fastest scanning tool yet developed
and promises to hasten detection.
Similarly, the IWF internal software
development team are currently
building to further automate the
search for child sexual abuse
material on the ‘dark net’. The ‘Dark
Web’ crawler was created by
Richard Franks of Simon University
and has been working with the IWF
Technical team to adjust the crawler
to compliment the work the IWF
already do online. Once the crawler
is up and running, it will crawl
hidden services for known child
sexual abuse and alert analysts to
new content.
A ‘crawler’ follows 
links on websites to 
discover new 
websites and stores 
this information.
Internet Company Responses
Most major Internet companies
have taken steps to fight CSAI on
their platforms. Facebook, Twitter,
and Google use Microsoft’s
PhotoDNA image hashing system to
tackle CSAI on their platforms. This
may explain why the proportion of
detected CSAI on social media
platforms is reportedly low.
In August 2017, the IWF, in
partnership with Microsoft
launched a new service – VideoDNA.
VideoDNA utilises custom software
and PhotoDNA algorithms to hash
stills of child sexual abuse images
within videos. With this technology,
reviewing and categorising videos
takes a few minutes rather than
hours to complete and with less risk
that a reviewer might identify some
small parts of the video incorrectly.
Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning
Tools are being developed by
technologists and in partnership
with law enforcement to bring the
power of AI and ‘deep learning’ to
image recognition. Experts believe
this technology has great potential,
for instance, in identifying likely new
CSAI before it is shared, or in
automatically determining the age
of a victim or severity of an abusive
act.
This technology would greatly
accelerate identification of CSAI and
of victims, while easing the
psychological burden on operatives
tasked with classifying this data.
However, the pace of technological
development requires continued
investment here.
Deep learning is a 
kind of artificial 
intelligence (or AI) 
that allows 
computer programs 
to automatically 
learn and improve 
from experience.
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International Investigations
The UK is frequently seen as the
global benchmark for combating
CSAI. The IWF, CEOP, GCHQ, the
NSPCC and other charities, and law
enforcement, have formed a strong
national network of cooperation.
Nonetheless, experts did note that
even greater levels of cooperation
could be achieved.
Major successes in investigating
CSAI distribution rings have tended
to rely on two pillars: international
cooperation and forensic detective
work.
Europol, Interpol, the FBI, and
national enforcement around the
world have worked together on
some of the largest operations in
the last decade.
Formed in 2015, the WePROTECT
Global Alliance emanated from a
merger of the Global Alliance
Against Child Sexual Abuse Online
(led by the US Department of Justice
and EU Commission) and the UK’s
WePROTECT initiative, and
represents the most
comprehensive global initiative to
establish coordinated and
comprehensive national responses
to CSAI. Other initiatives include
INHOPE, an international network of
hotlines to report illegal content
online.
In 2014, a joint 
Australian-Europol 
investigation gained 
access to Playpen, a 
website distributing 
CSAI. The FBI was 
able to unmask 
users accessing the 
site. When it was 
shut down in 
February 2015, 
there were over 
215,000 users and 
23,000 images and 
videos. There have 
been some 900 
arrests and 
investigations 
continue.
Google has introduced changes to
its search algorithms to limit results
for CSAI queries, as well as
restricting access to known
websites through its Chrome
browser. Both the IWF and Thorn (a
US-based NGO) have also worked
with the search engines to redirect
potential offenders towards help
based on their search queries.
Facebook also restricts searches for
certain keywords across its services.
In 2006, service providers formed
the Technology Coalition to jointly
fight online CSAI and develop new
tools. In partnership with the US
National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC), they
made over 8.1 million reports of
suspected CSAI in 2016 alone.
However, NCMEC does not publish
a breakdown of these figures so it is
not known where this material is
most commonly found.
Despite having adopted Terms of
Service and technical tools that
tightly restrict illegal and even ‘grey
area’ content, social media
companies remain under pressure.
The volumes of content on these
websites, numbered in the billions
of photos, comments and
messages, make policing the
platform difficult. Provision of
messaging platforms also provides
a channel between offenders and
victims, a tool exploited by online
groomers. Finally, they provide an
environment in which young
people, and parents or friends of
young people, are encouraged to
share images. Despite privacy
warnings, these are often public,
and used as material by offenders.
“The problem is the “long tail” of providers -
small companies hosting material that can’t
deal with the responsibilities that come from
hosting. The big players can’t do everything.”
Expert Interviewee
Preventing
Online CSAI
05.
(MoJ 2017)
PREVENTION
Efforts to address online CSAI have
largely focused on the detection
and prosecution of offenders and
protection of victims, but far less
has been done in the realm of
prevention. Experts across the
board have highlighted the need for
a different approach to prevention,
including the NSPCC, which stated
last year that ‘it is a focus on
prevention that will make the long-
term difference.’
Currently, the main source of help
for potential offenders in the UK is
the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, which
provides the Stop It Now! Helpline
(0808 1000 900) and Get Help
website (get-help.stopitnow.org.uk)
for abusers and those at risk of
abusing. The Specialist Treatment
Organisation for the Prevention of
Sexual Offending (StopSO) also
supports potential offenders by
helping them find trained therapists
and providing training for
professionals. Despite the work of
these organisations, support pre-
offence is limited in its reach and
scope. For example, the Stop It
Now! helpline estimates that it
misses around 1500 calls each
month due to lack of resources.
Better public understanding might
encourage potential offenders to
seek help sooner and avoid
offending. Germany’s Dunkelfeld
Prevention Project (www.dont-
offend.org) has led the way in
prevention internationally. The
project began in 2005 as a large-
scale media campaign advertising
free confidential medical treatment
to paedophiles who wanted clinical
help.
For instance, the campaign slogan
was:
“You are not at fault for your sexual
feelings, but you are responsible for
your sexual behaviour! There is help
available! Don’t offend!”
Over 8000 people have sought help
through the project since its
inception and some 260 people are
currently in therapy. Treatment
consists of cognitive behavioural
therapy and optionally medication
to either reduce sex hormones or
their effect. The Dunkelfeld project
has been a source of much-needed
information on non-offending
paedophiles and early academic
assessments of its effectiveness are
positive.
The second approach adopted in
the UK has been to help convicted
offenders refrain from re-offending.
Reoffending rates for sexual crimes
are actually relatively low – in the
UK, it is around 15 per cent
(compared to 40 per cent for theft,
for example) – further reinforcing
the view that interventions must
take place prior to the first offence.
In prison, CSAI offenders can take
part in Sex Offenders Treatment
Programmes (SOTP), including one
programme specifically focused on
Internet crimes. Evaluations of
these programmes have been
largely positive, finding significant
decreases in pro-offending
attitudes. However, there is
anecdotal evidence that many CSAI
offenders in the UK do not receive
long enough prison sentences to
take part in these programmes
while serving their sentences.
(Beier et al. 2014)
(Beier & Loewit 
2013)
(Jütte 2016)
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(Davidson et al. 2009)
Outside of prison, Circles UK offers
support for ex-offenders to
reintegrate into the community.
Circles brings together several
volunteers from the community
who meet regularly with the ex-
offender to help reduce their social
isolation, develop pro-social
behaviours, and follow any
treatment programmes. In 2015/16,
there were 137 ex-offenders in the
programme. However, there have
been no systematic studies of the
effectiveness of the Circles.
As well as programmes for
offenders and potential offenders,
there are also programmes to
educate potential victims. The
leading example of this in the UK is
the CEOP’s Thinkuknow curriculum
and related teaching resources,
which was estimated in 2009 to
have reached 14 per cent of UK
children. The programme has been
shown to children’s likelihood of
reporting threatening online
experiences, but did not affect their
propensity to share personal
information or interact with
strangers. It is likely that
Thinkuknow has improved in
effectiveness since this review, as
resources have been developed
that are more targeted to different
age groups and using more varied
teaching styles, but no evaluations
have been conducted since.
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Recommendations
06.
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We conclude there are seven areas in which government, tech
companies and the media might improve in combating CSAI.
Focus on the Top
of the ‘Pyramid’
If indeed the number of adults engaging
with CSAI is as high as predicted, and the
goal is to minimise harm to children, it is
right that law enforcement must focus on
dismantling the top of the ‘pyramid’:
contact abuse and those producing CSAI.
This is not being ‘soft on paedophiles’, but
rather a sensible way of targeting limited
resources.
Improve Measurements of 
Online CSAI
Better estimates for the amount of
content circulating on the Internet, and
the numbers of UK users viewing it, are
vital. Law enforcement reports should
distinguish between ‘contact abuse’,
online crimes, and CSAI specifically.
Technology companies should, where
accurate data is available, be more
transparent about the volumes of material
found on their platforms.
Invest in
Technology
Although technology is not a silver bullet,
it is vital that law enforcement can keep
pace with technological change. Advances
in technological solutions have been
widely hailed by experts in enforcement
and prevention, and the development of
future tools in areas such as image
categorisation and biometric victim
identification must be supported.
Educate
We strongly believe that digital life skills
should be part of the PSHE curriculum,
and that the pitfalls of sharing content
online, including sexual content, should
form part of the syllabus. As the amount
of self-produced illegal content continues
to increase, stopping this at its source is
the only sensible response. Education is
needed to support potential victims and
perpetrators of sextortion and peer-on-
peer abuse, a growing problem.
Facilitate Sharing
and Cooperation
Designing new technology, improving
existing technology and adopting new
tools in the fight against CSAI requires the
legal sharing of highly sensitive data. This
must be carefully facilitated: without
access to data, it is more difficult for
researchers to develop tools, and without
access to tools, websites are not able to
implement them to curtail CSAI.
As the vast majority of CSAI is stored
outside of our borders, international
cooperation will be the key to combating
it. In the wake of Brexit, ensuring close
collaboration between international police
forces must be prioritised.
28
Demos Technology Briefings Online Child Sexual Abuse Imagery
Report Responsibly
It will not be possible to ensure informed
public debate around online CSA without
responsible reporting practices on this
issue. Four preliminary guidelines are
suggested as good practice reporting tips:
First, images should be referred to as
either ‘indecent images of children’ (IIOC)
or ‘child sexual abuse images’ (CSAI). The
term ‘child pornography’ is misleading:
pornography is material that is produced
and consumed by consenting adults,
which cannot include children. Referring
to child abuse material as ‘pornography’
minimises the necessarily abusive way in
which material is produced.
Second, reports should give details of
sources of support for both victims and
potential offenders. This can encourage
victims to come forward and potential
offenders to seek help. The purpose of
potential abusers charities is not to
defend paedophiles, but protect children,
in a similar way to other crime prevention
interventions.
Third, broader context should be given.
According to the NSPCC, in 90 per cent of
cases, offenders have a close connection
(such as family, neighbour, or teacher)
with their victims. In addition, a significant
proportion of material is generated by
children and young people themselves.
Reports on incidents of abuse should help
provide this context to better equip
children and their guardians.
Fourth, caution should be exercised when
referring to the methods of abuse,
including grooming, and sharing and
storage of images. Details of the methods
used may inform other offenders. Lessons
should be learned from the success of the
Samaritan’s guidelines for reporting
suicide.
A Greater Focus
on Prevention
The NSPCC advised in their 2016 report
that it would not be possible to “arrest our
way out” of the problem, a sentiment
echoed by every expert we interviewed.
Estimates of the number of individuals
who may have viewed CSAI range from
50,000 to over 500,000; even taking the
lowest estimates, locking up all
perpetrators is not a viable option.
More funding could be made available to
charities dealing with preventing contact
paedophilia like the Lucy Faithfull
foundation. Awareness of their work, and
helplines for people concerned about
their own feelings, should form a part of
media coverage.
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FOR MORE
INFORMATION
To report child abuse to the police in the UK, call 999 or 101. More
information is available at www.gov.uk/report-child-abuse.
If you are worried about a child’s safety, you can also call the National Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) on 0808 800 5000 or go to
www.nspcc.org.uk.
To learn about and contribute to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual
Abuse (IICSA), go to www.iicsa.org.uk.
To report online child abuse images and learn about the Internet Watch
Foundation (IWF), go to www.iwf.org.uk.
To find help for offenders or potential offenders in the UK, go to the Lucy
Faithfull Foundation (www.lucyfaithfull.org.uk) or the Specialist Treatment
Organisation for the Prevention of Sexual Offending (StopSO)
(www.stopso.org.uk). For resources overseas, go to helplinks.eu.
For educational materials on CSAI, go to CEOP’s Thinkuknow programme
www.thinkuknow.co.uk.
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Eric King, Former Deputy Director at Privacy International
Katie O’Donovan, Public Policy Manager at Google UK
Elena Martellozzo, Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University
Jonathan Baggaley, Chief Executive of the PSHE Association
Fred Langford, Deputy CEO of the Internet Watch Foundation
David Gray, National Online CSE Coordinator for England & Wales Police
Jacqueline Beauchere, Chief Online Safety Officer at Microsoft
Brooke Istook, Strategy and Operations Director at Thorn
Yiota Souras, Senior Vice President, General Counsel at NCMEC
John Shehan, Vice President, Exploited Children Division at NCMEC
Novi Quadrianto, Associate Professor at University of Sussex
Julie de Bailliencourt, EMEA Safety Policy Manager at Facebook
We would also like to thank the experts who contributed to the research but
who did not wish to be named in the briefing paper. Demos is committed to
gathering input from a wide range of organisations and experts on this issue.
Due to time constraints, some organisations may not have been contacted
during the research period. However, we continue to invite suggestions and
contributions.
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